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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RCTH YV. SHUPE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
ROY A. ~IENLO\'E, dba )IEXLOYE 
COXSTRGCTIO:N CO)IP ANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
10405 
In plaintiff-respondent's action for a declaratory 
judgment construing a written cost-plus-percentage 
contract for the construction of a home and to enjoin 
lien foreclosure pending determination of the case, 
defendant-appellant counterclaimed under the contract 
and for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The controversy oyer amounts owed to appellant 
1 
was submitted to a jury on :l special verdict containing 
three interrogatories (R. 133). The jury determined 
that appellant ha<l substantially performed, that his costs 
including profit and overhead, totaled $43,000.00, and 
that respondent was entitled to a $1,230.00 offset for 
defective construction and delay. From the $43,000.00 
figure the COJ.Irt deducted the off set and the sum of 
$18,551.00, agreed to have been paid to appellant pre-
viously, and entered judgment for $23,219.00 plus 
$2,136.14 interest, or a total of $25,355.14, each party to 
bear his own costs and attorney's fee (R. 137-139). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent has not appealed, believing that the 
judgment of the trial court is supported by the record. 
The appellant contends that the jury was obligated to 
award him all costs of construction as shown by his own 
books and records, and that he was entitled to costs and 
attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts is devoted primarily 
to evidence1 he believes supports his contention that the 
jury was required to award him approximately 
$50,000.00 for partial completion of a $35,000.00 house. 
Most of the testimony and evidence supporting the ver· 
i Some reliance is placed on "evidence" not offered at the trial. 
For example, at page 8 of his brief appellant quotes fromd ~;: 
Shupe's deposition, and at page 10 from one of respon en s 
answers to interrogatories. Neither of these excerpts was pre· 
sented to the jury. 
2 
did and judgment is omitted, glossed-over, or passed-off 
as being material to some other issue. Accordingly, it is 
difficult for respondent to meet her obligation under 
Rule 7 5 ( p), U tab Rules of Civil Procedure, to express 
specific disagreement with inaccurate statements of fact. 
There is no dispute that under date of November 2, 
HHi2, respondent and appellant entered into a contract 
(Exhibit P-1) under which appellant was to construct 
a residence on respondent's lot at 1203 Yale Avenue. 
Respondent's husband, Clarence G. Shupe, had had 
plans prepared by an architect and the Shupes met with 
appellant to discuss them ( R. 162). Mrs. Shupe testified 
that at the meeting appellant said the building would 
rn5t no more than $35,200.00, the price being based upon 
an estimate of $12.00 per square foot for the main floor, 
$6.00 per square foot for a basement apartment, 
$1,000.00 for a carport, $300.00 for the garage, $1,500.00 
for extra concrete, $1,500.00 for a patio, $800.00 for a 
redwood fence, $1,300.00 for contingencies, and 
$3,200.00 for owrhead and profit (Exhibit P-2). Ap-
pellant promised completion promptly- not more than 
four months ( R. 208). 
Appellant submitted statements to the Shupes and 
for a time the statements were paid in due course, but 
when l\Iarch, April and May bills totaling over $19,-
000.00 were all presented at once, costs had risen to about 
$38,000.00 with $12,000.00 worth of work remaining to 
make th~ house habitable, and appellant was told to 
moye off the job (R. 186). Thereafter, work was done 
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to put the house in such condition that it could be occu-
pied by the Shupes (R. 206). 
The amount awarded by the jury as costs of con-
struction was almost $8,000.00 more than appellant had 
said the house would cost. 
Trial of the cause began on March 2, 1965, and 
ended at about 10:30 o'cloc,k p.m. on March 10, 1965. 
During the seven trial days respondent called seven 
witnesses and appellant twenty-six. The transcript of 
testimony contains 758 pages. Sixty-nine exhibits, con· 
taining numerous documents were offered in evidence, 
and sixty-eight were admitted. 
It is not practical to set forth all testimony or 
exhibits tending to support the verdict. But the facts 
set out below certainly justify a jury finding that ap· 
pellant's costs were substantially less than claimed: 
Prior to execution of the cost-plus-percentage con· 
tract dated November 2, 1962, the appellant made a 
detailed analysis of specifications on an FHA form 
(Exhibit P-14; R. 211-212, 244-245). He calculated 
a price of $12.00 a square foot for a main floor of 
1,800 square feet and added various extra costs, telling 
the Shupes that the amount computed by him repre· 
sented the "outside costs" of construction ( R. 164) · 
The contract was drawn by appellant himself (R. 
235). It provided that Menlove C!mstruction Company 
would maintain liability insurance and all insurance 
"necessary with labor as to compensations for any type 
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of insurance necessary under the laws of the State of 
Utah" (Exhibit P-1). There had been no discussion 
with .Mr. or Mrs. Shupe about charging separately for 
the part of overhead reflected by Social Security taxes, 
payroll taxes, unemployment compensation and the like, 
but in charging his costs, it was appellant's practice to 
add to payroll costs ten per cent for Social Security, 
payroll taxes, and unemployment taxes, prior to the 
addition of another ten percent for overhead and profit 
(R. 239-241). 
During the construction of the house great quanti-
ties of materials, including lumber, paint, hardware, 
and other supplies, were purchased from Apex Lumber 
Company. The painter, who had submitted a bid in-
cluding labor and paint, was told to obtain his paint 
through Apex (R. 696). Appellant was a substantial 
owner of Apex Lumber Company (R. 245). It was the 
practice of Apex to charge "wholesale price" plus ten 
percent on supplies and materials purchased by the four 
o\\·ners of the company. Of this ten percent, five percent 
was for overhead and five percent was added to the 
"capital investment" of the owner-purchaser ( R. 7 46), 
increasing his equity in the business ( R. 7 42). During 
the time that materials were being purchased from 
Apex Lumber Company for the Shupe residence, the 
manager of the company (R. 253), and the painter 
(R. 259) both knew that the material was being pur-
chased for use on a cost-plus contract (R. 253). During 
construction Mr. Menlove had mentioned to Mr. Shupe 
that he had an interest in Apex and could get materials 
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and save money through that company, but he did not 
disclose that he stood to make an additional profit because 
of purchases from Apex Lumber Company (R. 253). 
An independent builder, Carl R. Ohran, who had no 
captive lumber company could buy lumber at prices at 
about the same level as those shown to have been charged 
by Apex (R. 361). 
Max .Menlove, appellant's son, was to be the super-
visor of construction, but during the period he was also 
supervising construction of the World Motor Hotel 
addition. He was making periodic checks at the Shupe 
residence. The men employed by Menlove "knew what 
they were doing" so it appeared unnecessary to him to 
have anyone else supervise them (R. 263-264). 
Appellant's record-keeping indicates he was not 
too concerned with skyrocketing costs on the Shupe 
home. Each of his men kept a time card which was turned 
in every two weeks. The cards reflected that a man was 
on the job, but not what he was doing (R. 264). Max 
.Menlove admitted it was the practice of appellant, on 
cost-plus contracts, to keep track of the hours worked 
by the men but only to keep track of them as a cost, 
how the costs are running being "entirely up to the 
owner, what he expects and does" (R. 267). But in 
keeping track of time spent on his own fixed price con-
tracts, it was customary for the appellant to maintain 
records of how the men were spending their time, so 
that a judgment could be formed as to whether the job 
is being operated efficiently ( R. 266-267, 308). 
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In proceeding with the Shupe contract, sometimes 
competitive prices were obtained and sometimes they 
weren't ( R. 270). No record was kept of the bid received 
on lumber purchased from Apex Lumber Company 
(R. 274). Some of the prices for concrete on the job 
included overtime charges, which resulted in the failure 
to unload a truck within the time allotted by a concrete 
vendor ( R. 27 4). Men from the Shupe job were some-
times moved down to the World Motor Hotel job. At 
the World Motor Hotel job (also cost-plus) a "fairly 
good record" was kept as to where the time and materials 
were spent ( R. 277). No cost breakdown was made with 
respect to the Shupe residence until it was needed for 
the lawsuit ( R. 309). 
Appellant had his painter obtain paint from differ-
ent wholesalers and then run the purchase through Apex 
Lumber. Max Menlove did not attempt to control the 
amount of paint purchased. The amount charged re-
spondent for the paint was based entirely upon how 
much the painter ordered ( R. 278) . Max Menlove, the 
supenisor, never did make an inspection of the area 
or determine whether the paint subcontractor was order-
ing more paint than he needed (R. 279). Although 
appellant obtained a bid under which the painter was 
to furnish the paint and labor for $1,680.00 (R. 669), 
the painter and his two employees were placed on the 
Menlove payroll, with the paint being obtained from 
Apex Lumber Company (R. 280). The Shupes were 
charged $1,695.00 for painters' labor, of which about 
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$1,400.00 was paid to the painters (Exhibit IO, p. I: 
R. 692). 
Dissatisfaction with construction of the house led 
.Mr. Shupe to complain to the Utah State Department 
of Contractors ( R. 321). .Mr. E. A. Hendrickson of 
that department made an inspection and found numer· 
ous instances of substandard, faulty or unfinished con· 
struction, for example: the paint was peeling because 
sheet metal fills were not soldered at the joints and per· 
mitted water to get underneath them ( R. 323) ; the hose 
bib on the south side of the house protruded from the 
wall some two inches ( R. 323) ; planter boxes needed 
to be waterproofed and the strike on the front door was 
poorly installed ( R. 323) ; sidelights on the front door, 
both inside and out, were below standard; the concrete 
front door sill had not been tiled or stoned and water 
was thus permitted to go through the sill into the base· 
ment ( R. 323) ; the sill on the tool closet was very rough 
and indications were that no effort had been made to 
finish it; the soil under the front walk, and that at the 
south side of the house to the east had all settled, and 
there was an opening under it for an area of some eight 
feet; the risers and treads of the outside stairway to 
the basement were not of equal size, not according to 
code, and dangerous; the window well in the basement 
apartment had not been plastered and there was no 
caulking around any of the openings ( R. 324) ; the con-
crete sill upon which the sliding door rests was poured so 
high on the outside that a screen could not be installed 
b d d yerv on the sliding door; concrete was honeycom e an · 
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rough, not having been properly tamped; the bridging 
awl the herringbone structures between the floor joists 
was I x 2, while the building code calls for I x 3 (R. 
325) ; one of the water heaters was turned in such a 
manner that it was impossible to obtain access to the 
controls or to put a hose on the bottom of the tank to 
drain it; the basement apartment door to the guest 
closet was badly warped; on the west balcony a beam 
had been slivered in several places, and the decora-
tions had been put over the slivered part; the sliding 
door on the east of the livingroom could not be opened 
with anything except quite a great effort because it 
was under a great presure from the top (R. 326) ; the 
tile in the master bedroom was very poor; wardrobe 
doors in the northwest bedroom were not plumb; the 
main entrance door to the northwest bedroom door 
was "hinge bound and warped" (R. 327). In the opin-
ion of Mr. Hendricksen, a great many of the items to 
which he referred were "caused or the result of lack 
of supervision" ( R. 329) . 
Carl R. Ohran, an experienced homebuilder, made 
an inspection of the Shupe home for the purpose of 
estimating the cost of completion, examining the defects, 
and arriving at a conclusion as of the cost of construc-
tion (R. 3-t.6-347). In making his examination Mr. 
Ohran examined the home itself, plans and drawings, 
and statements and invoices submitted by appellant 
(R. 349). 
The rafter beams in the house had failed, and his 
opinion was that they woud not have if gussets had been 
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glued and nailed in accordance with good building 
practices ( R. 349), in which case the bond would hare 
been stronger than the beams. Mr. Ohran noted that 
the paint had been poorly applied, surfaces having been 
improperly prepared by sanding and spackling, that 
the water heater had been installed backwards and that 
part of the plumbing was not complete ( R. 350). The 
steps leading out of the basement required correction. 
the front entrance platform was so placed that it 
drained into the front door, indicating improper grading 
or sinking, probably a result of carelessness in grading 
the concrete when it was installed. Two or three doors 
had warped and needed replacement, and joints on the 
balcony and the balcony railing had been damaged by 
water and warping ( R. 352). Dirt had settled out 
from under the raised walk along the carport ( R. 352). 
Mr. Ohran's opinion was that the reasonable costs 
of construction of that house on that lot, from the 
ground up and including the ten per cent for over· 
head and profit, would come to about $35,000.00 -
some $7,000.00 under the figure the jury ultimately 
found the construction did cost-and this cost would 
include all on site construction with the exception of 
retaining walls that were put in to retain the upper 
banks ( R. 356-357) . Of this cost, about $4,000.00 
would be for labor ( R. 358 )-a figure some $8,000.00 
less than the cost of labor testified to by Max Menlove 
(R. 313). Painting labor costs would be about $600.00 
or $700.00, instead of $1,695.00 (R. 361). 
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Prices charged for lumber by Apex Lumber Com-
pany were about the same as those at which Mr. Ohran 
could purchase similar lumber at retail ( R. 361) . The 
quality of the items used in the Shupe home were about 
average quality ( R. 397). 
That the construction was so shoddy that it was 
unlikely appellant could have spent the amount claimed 
1ras also evidenced by photographs of various parts 
of the building and areas of construction, admitted in 
e\'idence as Exhibits P-16 through P-45 (R. 422-438). 
Improper preparation of the subsoil led to subsi-
dence of the patio concrete, evidenced by the accu-
mulation of water during wet weather (R. 471). 
Testimony of applicant's subcontractors varied to 
a considerable degree as to what was done and what 
the participation of the Shupes was. Some testified 
that they believed that their recovery from Mr. Menlove 
depended upon the outcome of his claim against the 
Shupes ( R. 650, 707 -708) . 
The plumbing and heating contractor had diffi-
culty in his installation because of the fact that the 
appellant had dumped "two big loads of gravel" in 
the house, rendering more difficult the work of the sub-
contractor ( R. 507) . 
In excavating for the building appellant's men 
used a truck with sides only 12 or 18 inches high, and 
no record was kept of the number of loads hauled (R. 
608). The supervision exercised by Max Menlove con-
11 
sisted of his coming on the job, telling the men what 
should be done, staying there if he was able to, or 
leaving if he had something else to do ( R. 609) . It 
was sometimes the practice of the men to work on both 
the Shupe residence and the Motor Hotel on the same 
day (R. 609). 
Paul Menlove, one of the appellant's sons, was 
employed in the organization at a monthly gross salary 
of $510.00 (R. 752, 777) for 50 or 60 hours per week. 
The amount he received from appellant was $2.00 to 
$2.50 per hour, but the Shupes were charged the stand· 
ard carpenter rate of $3.25 per hour plus 10 per cent 
for Social Security, unemployment compensation, and 
other payroll taxes ( R. 778). 
Appellant testified that he talked with .Mr. Shupe 
in June and that Mr. Shupe then thought that the 
house was costing too much money; but he had con· 
sistently refused to discuss any decrease in price and 
had insisted upon receiving the full $30,910.00, the 
amount of his claim as shown by his books (R. 798). 
The cost of all material and subcontractors on the 
job, exclusive of the overhead and profit for Menlove 
Construction Company and its own labor costs would 
have been about $33,700.00 (R. 870). 
Max Menlove, another of appellant's sons, worked 
in the business with the expectation of receiving the 
benefits of the business, that is, running the business 
and working into it someday. For his services he was 
paid a salary of approximately $700.00 per month, but 
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in computing the amounts charged to the respondents 
for services of Max Menlove, no attempt was made to 
determine how much those services actually cost appel-
lant (R. 877). 
There was some evidence introduced at the trial 
with respect to a great number of the matters alluded 
to in appellant's brief, and a jury might have accepted 
appellant's argument that the claimed costs were ac-
tually incurred. Appellant made a forceful argument 
to the jury, and same jury argument has been made to 
this court in the appellant's brief. As is frequently the 
case in jury arguments, the appellant's brief overstates 
the facts and arrives at invalid conclusions. For ex-
ample, from testimony that expensive door locks were 
used in the house, appellant says the Shupes made no 
effort to reduce costs; on the basis of testimony that the 
Shupes approved a number of subcontract bids appel-
lant concludes that they approved all of them, as well 
as the labor charges for appellant's sons and employees. 
The record is not "clear that Mr. and Mrs. Shupe 
apprm·ed each subcontract for each phase of construc-
tion and actually selected all of the items of any con-
sequence that went in the house," as stated on page 6 
of appellant's brief. Mr. Shupe testified that he was 
aware of many of the prices, but that the bid prices of 
all the subcontracts were very vague and usually were 
adjusted from one figure to another, and that he never 
did receive a formal subcontract which he could approve 
or disapprove (R. 196). 
The appellant states in his brief that "the record 
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is undisputed that the men employed by Menlove Con-
struction Company who worked upon the premises kept 
records with respect to their time and were compensated 
on the same basis as they were compensated in all other 
construction by the company," but as pointed out abore, 
there was evidence that the record keeping in connec· 
tion with fixed-price contracts and some other cost-plm 
contracts of the appellant were more detailed to reflect 
the amount of time spent on particular work, rather 
than just the amount of time that could be charged 
against the owner. 
In short, from three volumes of testimony the 
appellant has selected bits and pieces from which a 
jury might have found in his favor, and has relied upon 
them as constituting a basis upon which this court should 
hold as a matter of law that he is entitled to the relief 
he asks. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED AP· 
PELLANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOT,VITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND 
PROPERLY ENTERED JUDGMENT ~ 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT. 
In challenging the verdict of the jury, appellant 
appears to have lost sight of the fact that the burden 
was upon him to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the moneys he claims to have expended 
14 
were reasonably paid for materials and work on the 
job. 
Appellant also appears to have lost sight of the 
fact that evidence of the reasonable cost of construction 
of the house, appellant's early estimates or promise, 
and substandard workmanship and materials, are pro-
batiw not only upon such questions as "substantial 
performance" and "quantum meruit", but also upon 
whether claimed costs were actually and reasonably 
incurred by appellant in construction of the Shupe 
residence. 
The statement in appellant's brief (page 24) that 
the parties proceded on the assumption that appellant's 
damages were liquidated if he substantially performed, 
simply is not true. If it had been true, there would have 
been little purpose in appellant's calling a coterie of 
subcontractors in an attempt to prove his costs. 
Throughout the presentation of the plaintiff's case, 
eridence with respect to reasonable values, defects, and 
promises, and improper charges, were offered and ad-
nlitted without objection and without any request on 
the part of the appellant for a limiting instruction. 
From a plethora of testimony and documents relat-
ing to the use of labor, the purchase and stockpiling 
of materials and the extent to which the contractor 
may have paid subcontractors amounts to which they 
were not legally entitled, the jury arrived at a total 
cost figure. The jurors were not auditors and were not 
obligated to proceed after the manner of auditors. But 
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they were able to and did come to a definite conclusion 
as to the accuracy of the total claim of appellant. 
There was evidence from which the jury could find. 
for example, that the claimed costs were completely 
out of line with what the house should have cost and 
that it was unreasonable, therefore, to believe that all 
of the claimed amounts were in fact expended toward 
construction of the house; that although in his contract 
appellant had undertaken to pay all insurance and 
taxes relating to employees, he nevertheless added ten 
per cent to his payrolls for Social Security, workmen's 
compensation, insurance, payroll taxes, and the like; 
that he charged as a "cost" an amount credited to his 
capital account in Apex Lumber Company; that his 
workmen were permitted to keep incomplete and in-
accurate records relating to the job; that there was 
not enough supervision to make certain that charges 
for labor were accurate; that respondent was charged 
more than appellant's costs for services performed b)· 
appellant's sons; that although appellant could have 
had all of the painting done for $1,680.00, he charged 
the Shupes $1,695.00 for labor alone, instructed the 
painter to purchase paint from Apex and charged the 
respondents for the paint and his capital credit; and 
that the workmanship in the house was so poor that 
it was unlikely that the quantites of labor and materials 
charged by appellant were actually used on the job. 
Appellant had no cause to complain that the jury 
did not audit his accounts. The jury was not asked 
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to find with respect to individual adjustments, and the 
court is deemed to have made necessary findings on any 
:ssues not submitted. Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Appellant insists that the jury, in refusing to do 
what a ppelant wanted it to do, stubbornly ignored and 
refused to be guided by "competent, credible and un-
contradicted evidence" with respect to the appellant's 
costs. \Ve submit, however, that the case is not sub-
stantially different from Arnold "Wlachinery Company 
v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 246, 357 P.2d 
~96, which appellant cited and attempted to distinguish. 
In this case, as in Arnold Machinery, the record keeping 
and the means of knowing the extent of and necessity 
for expenditures were primarily within the control of 
the appellants; there were numerous and substantial 
improper charges; and evidence was presented through 
5elf-serYing records and through interested witnesses, 
induding subcontractors interested in a recovery by 
appellant. As the court said in that case, 357 P.2d 496, 
498: 
"One of the favorable aspects of trial by jury 
is that it provides a safeguard * * * by bringing 
together people of varied experience and differ-
ent points of view, and permitting them to apply 
their practical judgments in the settlement of 
disputes. '¥hen one party makes what they deem 
to be harsh, excessive or unreasonable demands, 
it is their privilege to modify or ameliorate them 
to comport with their own sense of fairness and 
justice. To accomplish that objective it is neces-
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sary Jhat the jury be allowed considerable lati-
tude of judgment; and their determination 
should not be disturbed so long as it appears to 
be within the limits of reason." 
The court pointed out in that case that if a witness 
can be disbelieved entirely, he can be disbelieved in 
part, or his testimony discounted to any reasonable 
extent. 
If there are circumstances which reasonably pro· 
vi de a basis for a jury to refuse to find in accordance 
with testimony, or where prejudice, bias, or self-interest 
is shown, or where there is anything incredible about 
the evidence, the jury need not accept it. Aagard v. 
Dayton & Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Company et al., 
12 Utah 2d 34, 361 P.2d 522; Page v. Federal Securit.IJ 
Insurance Company, 8 Utah 2d 226, 332 P.2d 666. 
Such circumstances, bias, and incredibility exist in this 
case. 
Moreover, the question presented to the jury was 
not simply one of the amount spent by appellant. The 
court's instruction No. 12 (R. 105) set out the law 
with respect to the right to recover on a cost-plus-per· 
centage contract as follows: 
"In a cost-plus-percentage contract with a 
licensed builder, an owner has the right to expect 
the same skill and ability to be applied to the 
work as would have been applied if the contractor 
had undertaken the work for a fixed price. 
"The burden is upon the defendant to establish 
that he proceeded honestly and skillf~llf and 
with due regard to the right of the plamtiff. In 
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this connection, you are instructed that a con-
tractor does not have the right to expend any 
amount of money he sees fit upon such a con-
tract, regardless of the propriety, the necessity, 
or honesty q,f the expenditure, but must show 
that the money he claims to have expended were 
reasonably paid for materials and work on the 
job." 
The appellant took no exception to the instruction 
as required by Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and while respondent recognizes the continuing power 
of the court to review the giving of the instruction, the 
court has held that it will not ordinarily do so unless 
some persuasive reason exists for failure to except, and 
that the burden of showing special circumstances rests 
upon the party seeking to avoid the effect of a rule. 
McCall v. McKendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962. 
Kot only did appellant fail to except to the instruction, 
he appears to have accepted it as the law of the case, 
not having referred to it in his statement of points. 
In any event, the instruction was substantially 
correct. Cases relating to recovery under cost-plus-
percentage contracts would have justified an instruction 
limiting appellant's recovery to his "reasonable costs." 
A good statement is found in Shaw v. Bula Cannon 
Shops, Inc., 205 Miss. 458, 38 So.2d 916: 
"The rules of law controlling 'cost-plus' con-
tracts are well established. Upon reason and 
authority, where a person agrees to do work for 
another upon a cost-plus basis, it is his duty 
to keep accurate and correct accounts of all ma-
terial used and labor performed, with the names 
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of the materialmen and laborers, so that the 
owner may check up the same. He must use 
the same skill and ability as is used in contract 
work for a gross sum. If the aggregate cost upon 
the face of the account is so excessive and un· 
reasonable as to suggest gross negligence and 
fraud, the law would impose upon the contractor 
the duty of establishing the bona fides of his 
performance of the work. The contractor does 
1 
not have the right to expend any amount of 
1 
money he may see fit upon the work, regardless 1 
of the propriety, necessity, or honesty of the 
expenditure, then compel repayment by the other 
1 
party, who has confided in his integrity, ability 1 
and industry. [citing cases]. In an action upon 
his contract for payment, the contractor must 
show that the moneys which he claims to hare 
expended were necessarily paid for materials 
and work upon the .job and if the contractor fails 
to do thiY he should only be allowed a reasonable 
cost and his percentage." (Emphasis added). 
The case was cited with approval in Walsh Sert1ices 1 
v. Feek, 45 Wash. 2d 289, 274 P.2d 117, a case in which 1 
a remodeling project estimated by a contractor to cost 
$4,592.98 ended up costing $9,172.02. The Washington 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's judgment that 
the contractor recover only for $4,982.54, noting that 
the trial judge had before him the original estimate, 
the invoice, the recap sheet and the job sheet, that he 
took notes, that he was thoroughly familiar with all , 
phases of the work done and that he saw and heard the 
witnesses. 
Other cases bearing upon the obligations of cost· 
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plus contractor are Wendell v. Maybury, 75 So.2d 379 
(La. App. 1954); Lagasse v. Allen, 54 So.2d 6 (La. 
1951) ; Lee v. National Cylinder Company, 58 So.2d 
568 (La. App. 1952); Jensen v. Manthe, 95 N.W. 
2d 699 (Neb. 1959) ; 1'itle Guarantee & Trust Com-
pany v. Pam, 155 N.Y.S. 333, aff'd 192 App. Div. 
268, 182 N.Y. Sup. 824, 232 N.Y. 441, 134 N.E. 525; 
Pathe' Laboratories v. DuPont Film Mfg. Corp., 3 
F.R.D. 11 (U.S.D.C., So. D. N.Y. 1943}. 
Appellant's position is not helped by the fact that 
respondent was the one who introduced appellant's 
invoices in evidence or otherwise offered testimony relat-
ing to appellant's billings. The evidence was offered 
to prove what appellant attempted to charge, not what 
costs were properly incurred. Besides, even if a party 
is "bound by his own evidence," he is not precluded 
from presenting contrary or conflicting evidence, and 
obtaining its benefits. The citation from Corpus Juris 
Secundum, at least in the present edition, does not sup-
port th~ statement in appellant's brief. See 32A C.J.S., 
Evidence § 1040 ( 1), p. 762: 
" * * * Since a party cannot question the 
credibility of the evidence. which he presents, 
where he introduces evidence adverse to his con-
tontions, and fails to contradict such evidence, 
he is precluded thereby. 
"It is only in this limited sense and as another 
formulation of the rule against impeachment of 
one's own witnesses iu certain ways that the 
frequent statement that one is bound by the 
evidence that he produces has any validity. A 
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party's claim or defense need not be rejected by 
the court merely because he produces any evi-
dence which negates this contention. Adverse 
testimony on a material issue by a party's witness 
will not def eat his claim if his case is established 
by other competent evidence. The fact that the 
evidence presented by a party is contradictory 
and conflicting and that some of his evidence is 
adverse to his contentions does not defeat his 
right to prevail; he is not bound by the more 
adverse evidence, but may ask the court to 
accept the testimony in the light most favorable 
to him. Similarly a party may ask that the court 
accept part and reject part of the testimony of 
a witness he has produced." 
The effect of a party being "bound" by his own 
evidence was considered by this court in Schlatter l'. 
McCarthy, 196 P.2d 968, 113 Utah 543, wherein the 
court said: 
" * * * but a party is not bound by every 
statement that his witness makes, and he may, 
by testimony of other witnesses and in argument 
to the jury, show that the facts are different 
from those testified to by the witness. This Is 
permitted, not for the purpose of impeaching 
the witness (although it may have that incidental 
effect), but for establishing the true facts. It 
would be a monstrous rule that would bind a 
party to every statement of every witness pro· 
duced by him. * * * The party who calls se~eral 
eyewitnesses is entitled to argue before the JUfY 
that it should believe the facts as testified to be 
the witness most favorable to him." 
See also McCormick on Evidence, page 70, in 
support of the view that the rule against impeaching 
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one's own witness does not forbid a party from produc-
ing other evidence to dispute the facts testified to by 
his witness. 
The jury had before it competent and credible 
evidence from which it could conclude that the costs 
claimed by appellant for construction of the house 
either were not incurred as claimed or were incurred 
unreasonably and in disregard of the rights of re-
spondent. 
II 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TIONS NUMBERS 3 AND 4 DID NOT COR-
RECTLY STATE THE LAW, AND THE 
COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
THEM. 
Appellant cites as error the trial court's refusal 
to give two requested instructions. Requested Instruc-
tion No. 3 would have advised the jury that the parties 
had entered into a written contract (for the construc-
tion of the house) and that it was in the nature of a 
cost-plus contract. There was no dispute as to these 
matters, and they were fairly covered in other instruc-
tions. 
It is not error for a trial court to refuse an instruc-
tion when its subject matter is adequately covered in 
other instructions given. Wilson v. Gardner, IO Utah 
2d 89, 348 P.2d 931; Duncan v. Western Refrigeration 
Co., 11 Utah 2d 19, 354 P.2d 572; and Rivas v. Pacific 
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Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 185, 397 P.2d 990. 
The remainder of the requested instruction was not 
only misleading and an incorrect statement of the law, 
but was in conflict with other instructions given by the 
court and expressly acquiesced in by appellant. The 
requested instruction would have told the jury that , 
their "sole duty and prerogative" was to determine · 
the total costs of construction, add ten percent and ! 
bring in a verdict for appellant in that amount. As 
indicated under Point I of this brief, this is not the 
law. The contractor under a cost-plus contract is not 
ipso facto entitled to his costs, plus the agreed percent-
age, but only to those costs reasonably, necessarily and 
in good faith incurred in connection with the contract. 
This was set out in Instruction No. 12 and is supported 
by the cases. 
In addition, the requested instruction is completely 
inconsistent with other instructions such as those relat-
ing to offsets. Appellant not only failed to take excep-
tion to such instructions but explicitly informed the 
court that the issue of offsets was properly in the case. 
In excepting to Instruction No. 22, counsel for appel-
lant said it was "the position of the defendant that the 
only issue properly submitted to the jury in this con-
nection is with respect to any offsets which the jury 
might find, if any" (R. 908). It is difficult to under-
stand how appellant can now take exception to the 
refusal of a proposed instruction which would hare 
eliminated that issue. 
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It is also well established that the trial court is 
not required to re-rrite a requested instruction or to 
O'ive one which is erroneous in any respect. Earle v. 
1' 
Salt Lake and Utah R. Corp., 109 Utah lll, 165 P.2d 
877; Bloomquist v. Buffelen Mfg. Co., 47 \Vash. 2d, 
828, 289 P.2d 1041. As stated by the Oregon Supreme 
Court in Schultz v. Shirley, 189 Ore. 363, 220 P.2d 86, 
88: 
"The trial court is not required to segregate 
the wheat from the chaff and give the portion 
of the instruction that is proper." 
In his argument concerning the court's refusal to 
gire the above instruction, appellant states that "the 
jury should have been instructed in substance and effect 
that they should not be permitted to speculate as to 
what the cost might have been by some other person 
in building the house." That, however, is not the instruc-
tion requested. 
Appellant also complains of the trial court's failure 
to give his requested Instruction No. 4. Generally, 
what respondent has said about Instruction No. 3 
applies as well to the latter instruction. Moreover, that 
requested instruction was in effect, an instruction for 
a directed verdict in appellant's favor-unwarranted 
by the evidence. 
Appellant's suggestion in his brief that "respond-
:nt will not even argue upon appeal that the contractor 
18 not entitled to recover costs plus 10% in the instant 
litigation" exemplifies an attitude evidenced throughout 
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his brief, that appellant had no responsibility to justify 
his claimed costs. It is now obvious that appellant's 
suggestion is erroneous. 
It is contended by appellant that he was entitled 
to a cautionary instruction that there is nothing illegal 
or improper about a cost-plus contract. Respondent 
submits that such an instruction was unnecessary. There 
was not even an intimation throughout the trial that 
such contracts were in any way improper. Other in· 
structions clearly imply that such were accepted types , 
of contracts, e.g., Instruction 12, 20, and 23. Appel· 
lant's assertion that there has been popular discredit 
in this area of cost-plus contract, is completely without 
foundation. 
In any event, as stated in 88 C.J .S., Trial, §320: 
"The giving or refusal of cautionary instruc-
tions rests largely in the discretion of the trial 
court, therefore the ref using of them is not error, 
especially where there is nothing in the evidence 
to indicate that they are needed, or where the 
jury are fairly instructed on the law of the 
case .... " 
See also 53 Am. Jur., Trial, §610. 
The verdict returned by the jury shows that the 
jurors were not under any misapprehension that the 
contract in the present case was illegal. 
III 
THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN RE· 
26 
FUSING TO RECEIVE DEFENDANT'S EX-
HIBIT 67; IN ANY EVENT, REFUSAL TO 
.ADMIT THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT PREJU-
DICIAL. 
Appellant complains that the trial court erred in 
refusing to admit a summary prepared by appella11t 
purportedly showing costs incurred on the job. Error 
is predicated primarily upon Section 78-25-15 ( 5) Utah 
Code Annotated [cited by appellant as 78-2.5-12(5)). 
That section provides that: 
"There can be no evidence of the contents of 
a writing, other than the writing itself except 
* * * 
" ( 5) 'Vhen the original consists of numerous 
accounts or other documents which cannot be 
examined in court without great loss of time, and 
the evidence sought from them is only the general 
result of the whole." 
For several reasons this exception to the best 
eridence rule is not applicable to this case. First, ap-
pellant's accounts were not so numerous that they 
could not be examined without a great loss of time. 
They constituted only a few thin manila folders, which 
were admitted in evidence. 
Second, and more important, the evidence from 
them was not merely the general result of the whole. 
Appellant, who prepared and identified the exhibits, 
testified as follows in response to a question as to what 
information he utilized in preparing the exhibit: (R. 
866): 
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"I utilized the invoices and the information 
on this invoice relative to materials and whe11 
they were delivered and the labor as it's shown 
there, and by my own information or knowledq1 
what I could remember from the job. Also wiial 
type of work individuals were doing for us 011 
the job." [Emphasis added.} 
From the above testimony it appears quite clearly 
that no sufficient foundation was established. The ex· 
hibit included items gained from the witness' own 
knowledge and what he could remember from the job. 
Nor does it come under the analagous rule expressed 
by this court in Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 
4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 and Nalder v. Kelloq1; 
Sales Company, 6 Utah 2d 367, 314 P.2d 350. As stated 
in the latter case, the exhibit was not "based on records 
or other data available for examination." 
Pertinent to this case is language contained m 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cloonan, 165 Kan. 68, 
193 P.2d 656, where the Kansas court held that it was 
error for the trial court to have admitted an alleged 
summary of books examined by the witness because he 
"assumed matters not shown by the records he ex· 
amined.'' 
In offering the exhibit, counsel for appellant di<l 
not even contend that the exhibit purported to be sup· 
ported by his books already in evidence, or that it was 
offered to prevent examination of a large number of 
books and records. The off er was made as follows (R. 
867): 
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''We offer Exhibit 67 as an aid to supplement 
the witnesses' testimony with respect to these 
matters. \Ve would stipulate that if there are 
any items which are contained in this exhibit, 
which are not reflected in the evidence, they may 
be disregarded, but this offer is made for the pur-
pose of illustrating and making more under-
standable the witnesses' proposed testimony 
* * * " [Emphasis added.] 
As pointed out in respondent's objection to the 
admission of the evidence, this would have had the effect 
of giving undue emphasis to the testimony of a par-
ticular witness. After having retired to the jury room, 
the jurors, while having to recall testimony of respond-
ent's witnesses, would have been able to peruse at will 
the contentions made by appellant, as his own principal 
Titness. 
In any event, the exclusion of the exhibit did not 
prejudice appellant. His counsel was permitted to and 
did use the exhibits to argue to the jury. He pinned 
the exhibit to the bulletin board and argued extensively 
from it, going down the same item by item. The jury 
had the "benefit" of the exhibit, and the only conse-
quence of its not being admitted was that they did 
not take it to the jury room. If there was error in 
refusing to admit the exhibit, it was harmless and non-
prejudicia,l to appellants. Under Rule 61, Utah Rules 
of CiYil Procedure, it would not be grounds for dis-
turbing the judgment. 
Further, respondent points out that the accuracy 
of the exhibit on its face is questionable. Items appear 
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' 
to have been duplicated (such as A-3 - C-12, and A-J.' 
I 
B-4 - C-15) or repeated for no explainable reason. It I 
is submitted that appellant's accounts, admitted in eri· ;' 
dence, are more understandable than the exhibit. 
IV i 
i 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO I 
I 
AWARD COSTS, INCLUDING A REASON- i 
ABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE TO THE APPEL· 
LANT. 
Before any action was brought there had been a 
serious dispute between the parties as to the amount 
due. The appellant himself testified that in a comer· 
sation about the charges Mr. Shupe had said that if 
appellant would take $23,000 for his claim, .Mr. Shupe 
1 
would pay it, but the offer was rejected by appellant 
as "ridiculous" (R. 796). The appellant adamantly 
1 
refused to take anything less than the total $30,910.00 
he claimed ( R. 798) . 
The respondent was thus faced with the prospect 
of either paying to appellant the total amount of his 
claim, even though the Shupes considered it much too 
high, or seeking a court determination of the amount. 
She elected to bring an action. 
On December 19, 1963, when the appellant had a 
period of approximately nine months remaining within 
which a lien foreclosure action could be brought (see 
lien claim, Exhibit D-62), the respondent filed a decla· 
ratory judgment action to determine the amount due. 
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fo paragraph 2 of her prayer, respondent asked the 
court to order that the time within which appellant 
might foreclose the lien be tolled pendente lite. 
The award of attorney's fees in lien foreclosure 
actions is governed by two sections of Title 38, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953: 
"38-1-17-As between the owner and the con-
tractor the court shall apportion the costs accord-
iny to the right of the case, but in all cases each 
subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall haYe his 
costs awarded to him, including the costs of pre-
paring and recording the notice of claim of lien 
and such reasonable attorney's fee as may be 
incurred in preparing and recording said notice 
of claim of lien. 
"38-1-18-In any action brought to enforce 
any lien under this chapter the successfu,l party 
shall be entitled to recoYer a reasonable attor-
ney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in this action." (Emphasis added.) 
Inasmuch as attorney's fees are referred to as being 
part of the "costs" of the action, and in owner-con-
tractor actions the court has the right to apportion 
costs "according to the right of the case," it is reason-
able to construe the sections as providing that in owner-
contractor actions the court may apportion attorney's 
fees according to the right of the case. It would be 
unreasonable for the legislature to permit the court 
to make an equitable adjustment in a few dollars of 
court costs, but require it to award the much larger 
attorney's fees to one party or the other without regard 
to the right of the case. 
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Moreover, under the facts and circumstances 01 
this case, the appellant was not the "successful party, 
the judgment awarded is in substantially the amount 
that Mr. Shupe had offered to pay appellant months 
before. Paragraph 7 of the respondent's complaint 
( R. 2) read as follows : 
"Plaintiff is ready and able to pay the amount 
lawfully due but believes and alleges that the 
amount claimed by defendant exceeds the amount 
actually due pursuant to the agreement of the 
parties; plaintiff further believes and alleges 
that if defendant incurred expenses in !ht 
amount claimed that he did so unnecessarilv be· 
cause of his negligence and inefficiency a~d or 
his lack of skill and ability as a builder and con· 
tractor.'' (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff obtained the relief she was seeking. There 
was no dispute as to whether some amount was due 
and owing. The purpose of the action was to establish 
the amount which was done. The amount awarded to 
the appellant was enough less than the amount of his 
claim that he should not be regarded as the successful 
party. The term is not defined in the code. 
This court apparently has not considered this exact 
question but a similar one was before the court in 
Millard v. Parry, 2 Utah 2d 217, 271 P.2d 8.52. There 
the contractor had sought to recover on a cost-plus con· 
tract but the court found that no cost-plus contract 
had been entered into. A judgment was ultimately 
entered providing that the homeowners would be obli· 
gated to pay subcontractors in the amount of $4,338.47, 
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which was $435.30 more than owed to the contractor 
by the homeowners. The contractor contended that 
attorney's fees and costs should not have been awarded 
to the homeowners because the court had found that 
at the commencement of trial a balance of $3,803.17 
was due from the homeowner to the contractor under 
the construction contract, notwithstanding the court 
thereafter permitted payment to be made directly to 
subcontractors. This court upheld the award of attor-
ney's fees to the homeowner. 
Hooper v. Fletcher, an early case decided by the 
Supreme Court of California, 145 Cal. 375, 79 Pac. 
418, was also an action for foreclosure of a mechanic's 
lien. The trial court, having originally granted attor-
ney's fees to subcontractors, ordered a new trial unless 
they agreed to elimination of the fee. The subcontractors 
, were seeking the full amount of their liens but were 
entitled only to a portion if the homeowner was correct 
in his contention, raised in the answer, that a contract 
between him and the original contractor had been re-
' eorded and was valid. He admitted that he had $1,025.00 
in his hands and averred his readiness to apply it to 
the payment of the lien. The court found that the 
contract was valid, but held in Finding No. 12 that 
the homeowners "participated in the trial herein, and 
entered into the contest in favor of certain defendants 
* * * and generally contested as to the disposition of 
said funds so deposited, and delayed and harassed 
plaintiffs and defendants, who were lien claimants, m 
the collection of their claims out of said funds." 
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On appeal the Supreme Court held that the e11. 
dence did not support the Finding and that a new tria1 
was proper, saymg: 
"As to the only question which the respondent 
Simas [the homeowner J raised by his answer ht 
was the prevailing party, and there was 110 
ground for imposing a lien on his land for these 
onerous attorney's fees, in addition to the bal· 
ance due on the contract, unless the facts found 
in Finding 12 were true." 
In the present case, because of the refusal of the 
appellant to consider a compromise of his claim, it was 
necessary for the respondent to seek court aid. She 
could not tender the amount due, since a determination 
of that amount required a proceeding in which the bona 
fides of appellant's expenditures could be ruled upon 
If lien claimants are entitled to recover an attor-
ney's fee in every case in which they establish a ralili 
lien (though for substantially less than the cla1111:, 
unconscionable results are foreseeable. The threat nf 
onerous attorney's fees could be used against home· 
owners for the purpose of coercing them into paying 
inflated lien claims despite a genuine dispute as to the 
amount due. By permitting the trial court to apportion 
the costs, including the attorney's fee, "according to 
the right of the case," the opportunity for extortion 
by either party can be eliminated. 
In any event, most of appellant's trial efforts were 
directed at proving a larger claim than he had coming. 
so that the trial court in determining a "reasonable fee'' 
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nught have made it zero. Appellant did not refer to 
any pages of the record supporting his claim for attor-
neys fees, and respondent has been unable to find any. 
v 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
THE APPELLANT'S .MOTION FOR NE\V 
TRIAL. 
Following entry of the judgment in the case the 
appellant moved for a new trial. The motion (R. 140) 
assigned each of the grounds specified in Rule 59, Utab 
Rules of Civil Procedure, except "accident or surprise" 
but was not accompanied by affidavits as required by 
Rule 59 \ c), and therefore lacks factual support with 
respect to irregularity in the proceedings, misconduct 
of the jury, and newly-discovered evidence. 
The other three grounds were substantially the 
same as have been urged by the appellant in connection 
with this appeal, i.e., that the evidence was insufficient 
to jusify the verdict, that he did not receive adequate 
damages, and that the court committed error in law. 
No new issue is presented by failure of the court 
to grant a new trial and there would appear to be no 
purpose in arguing this point at length. The respondent 
will content herself with pointing out that there is no 
basis for an assumption that the jury in this overly-
long, sometimes dull building contract case was influ-
enced by passion or prejudice; that motions for new 
trials are addressed to the discretion of the trial court; 
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and that its discretion will not be disturbed absent a 
clear abuse. Burlock v. Shupe, 5 Utah 428, 17 Pac. rn: 
Tousey v. Etzel, 9 Utah 329, 34 Pac. 291; and Cret/1
1
, 
v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264. 
CONCLUSION 
In this brief the respondent has cited to the cow: 
pages of testimony and exhibits justifying the jury, 
verdict and gainsaying appellant's lament that his co1: 
evidence was so "competent, credible and uncontra· 
dieted" that a jury had no choice but to beliew him 
all the way. 
The construction was shoddy, careless, and poorh 
supervised; the appellant made improper charge, 
against the job; and the total costs claimed were u11 
reasonable enough to raise questions as to his gou11 
faith, skill, and care, in looking out after the Shupt: 
interests, particularly in light of the cost-plus-percen' 
age formula that "higher costs equal higher profits.· 
The appellant's complaints about the refusal I 
give instructions and admit an exhibit in evidence ~r 
not well taken, and in any event do not represent anr 
error which can be shown to have been prejudicial 
Inasmuch as the respondent was the successfa 
party with respect to obtaining a determination of Iii 
amount claimed by appellant, and in good faith l1:1i 
offered to extend the time within which an action n1ig~ 
be brought to foreclose the lien of the appellant. an11 
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I 
\ 
l 
since the amount recovered by the appellant was sub-
stantially what had been offered by the respondent's 
husband some months before, the court was justified 
in refusing to award costs (includ,ing a reasonable attor-
ney's fee), to the appellant. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
Ralph L. Jerman 
411 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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